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A Political Analysis of the Economic Bubbles
in Japan and the U.S.:
A Critical Examination of Comparative Political Economy Models*
Ryunoshin KAMIKAWA†
Abstract
This article critically examines comparative political economy models by
analyzing cases of economic bubbles in Japan in the late 1980s and the U.S. in the
late 1990s. In comparative political economy, it has been argued that both low
inflation and low unemployment are accomplished in countries that have both an
independent central bank that places top priority on price stability and a wage-
bargaining system that leads to wage restraints. It is certain that the combination of
anti-inflationary monetary policies and wage restraints led to low inflation and low
unemployment both in Japan and the U.S. However, because of this combination,
commodity prices were stable even though stock prices surged. Hence, monetary
policies were not tightened and stock prices were inflated. Consequently, this
combination can cause a massive bubble once asset-price inflation emerges. Also,
the bursting of economic bubbles places deflationary pressures on the economy. In
summary, this combination does not necessarily ensure good economic
performance over the long term.
1. Introduction
An objective of this article is to examine the comparative political economy
models critically through analyzing cases of economic bubbles in Japan in the late
1980s and the U.S. in the late 1990s. Comparative political economy appeared in
the 1970s when industrialized countries experienced stagflation, or high
unemployment and high inflation simultaneously. Some countries were able to
overcome these early, but others were not. Comparative political economy have
been used to try to explain these divergences in macroeconomic performance
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between industrialized countries by using political factors. It has been argued that
wage restraints are needed to control cost-push inflation. It has also been thought
that wage restraints bring about recovery in corporate earnings and capital
investment and that this corrects the economy again and decreases unemployment.
Therefore, under what political conditions wages could be restrained also came to
be discussed.
However, in this article, I point out that although wage restraints certainly lead
to low inflation and low unemployment, simultaneously, they may inflate bubbles,
or elevate asset prices beyond those supported by the fundamentals. I will cite two
cases, viz., the stock price bubbles in Japan in the late 1980s and those in the U.S.
in the late 1990s.1) Comparative political economy models assume that wage
restraints result in good economic performance. By showing that stock price
bubbles were inflated in Japan and the U.S. where these situations occurred, I
maintain that comparative political economy models cannot fully explain the
economic performance of today’s industrialized countries. This is because they
have been established on the premise of structural inflation.2)
Another objective of this article is to explain economic bubbles in Japan and the
U.S. from the viewpoint of political analysis. According to one prevailing view, the
bubble economy in Japan was caused by lax monetary policies over a prolonged
time.3) Most political scientists and journalists and many economists asserted that
these policies were accepted because of the domination of the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) over the Bank of Japan (BOJ). They argued that the U.S. government
requested domestic demand be expanded to reduce the imbalance of payments
between the U.S. and Japan and that the MOF, which tried to avoid increasing
public spending, forced the BOJ to loosen its monetary policies.4) However, as will
be explained later, I do not think that the BOJ has depended on the MOF since the
late 1970s. If a lack of independence by the central bank brought about the
economic bubble, why did a stock-price bubble emerge in the U.S., where the
central bank was seen to be independent of the government? Moreover, the stock
price bubble in the U.S. can largely be explained by political factors, even though
some economic factors that caused it have been pointed out.
This article explains economic bubbles in Japan and the U.S., focusing on two
political factors, i.e., a system of wage bargaining and the independence of the
central bank, which have been seen as important explanatory variables in economic
performance. In both countries, commodity prices were stable, even though stock-
price bubbles were inflated. This was both because workers’ wages were restrained
and because private economic agents firmly believed that adequate monetary
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policies to control inflation should be implemented. Thus, monetary policies were
not tightened promptly and the bubbles were further inflated.5)
I will briefly explain why a wage-bargaining system and the independence of
the central bank are seen as “political” factors. First, workers’ wages are not only
dependent on the balance of supply and demand but also affected by wage
bargaining between trade unions and employers’ associations in each country.  The
ways in which trade unions and employers’ associations are organized (whether
centralized or decentralized) and at which level (at national, industrial, or firm
levels) wages are bargained differ between countries. Influential relations between
trade unions and employers’ associations, those within trade unions, and those
within employers’ associations are determined due to these differences. Thus, under
diverse wage-bargaining systems, there are increasingly different rates of wages,
even under the same economic conditions. In other words, a wage-bargaining
system is an institution that affects the “political process” between trade unions and
employers’ associations during wage bargaining.
Second, monetary policy should be managed by a central bank whose only goal
is price stability. However, governments generally tend to pressure central banks to
loosen monetary policies excessively, as they want economic expansion along with
political considerations. Therefore, monetary policies depend on whether central
banks are highly dependent on or independent of the government. In other words,
the independence of central banks is a concept that affects the “political process” in
determining monetary policies.
This article is organized as follows. The second section summarizes the
development of comparative political economy and explains that a wage-bargaining
system and independent central banks are regarded as explanatory variables of
economic performance. The third and fourth sections explain the stock price
bubbles in Japan in the late 1980s and those in the U.S. in the late 1990s, focusing
on wage restraints and monetary policies. The last section concludes the paper by
critically examining the comparative political economy models.
2. Development of Comparative Political Economy
This section explains the development of comparative political economy, where
both wage-bargaining systems that lead to wage restraints and independent central
banks that implement monetary policies to stabilize inflation result in sound
economic performance, even though the explanation will be brief and
oversimplified.
Low real wages in comparative political economy are thought to lead to both
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low inflation and low unemployment. Hence, there has been some controversy on
what type of wage-bargaining system can impose wage restraints.
In corporatist theory, it has been argued that if trade unions are centralized and
wage bargaining is conducted at the national level (or under a collective wage-
bargaining system), a peak trade union can have a peak employers’ association
secure employees’ jobs in exchange for the former restraining its demand to
increase wages.6) However, in both dualism theory and the hump-shaped model, it
has been argued that if trade unions are decentralized and wage bargaining is
conducted at the level of the firm, trade unions cannot negotiate wage increases
since they are compelled to choose between wage increases and job security.
Consequently, sound economic performance is achieved in countries where trade
unions are weak and decentralized as well as in those that are corporatist.7)
In the 1990s, the view prevailed that if employers’ associations were
centralized, wage restraints could be accomplished through coordination within
them, regardless of the degree of centralization of trade unions.8) Moreover, some
studies have argued that even if wage bargaining is conducted at the industrial
level, wages can be restrained under conditions where neither the protected sector
nor the public sector, but the export sector acts as a pattern setter in wage
bargaining. Both the employers and trade unions of the export sector are cautious
about increasing wages because this is exposed to international competition.9)
Furthermore, the attention of research since the late 1990s has focused on the
interaction between the independence of central banks and wage-bargaining
systems. It has been argued in economics that a high degree of independence by
central banks since the late 1980s has resulted in lower levels of inflation without
negatively affecting employment or economic growth.10) Political scientists agree
that highly independent central banks result in noticeably lower levels of inflation.
However, trade unions negotiate excess wage increases under the wage-bargaining
system, which cannot lead to wage restraints. When this occurs, an independent
central bank tightens monetary policy to curb labor cost-push inflation and
unemployment increases as a result, even though inflation is lowered. However,
under the wage-bargaining system, which can lead to wage restraints, trade unions
restrain wage demands voluntarily and secure workers’ jobs. This is because they
are certain that an independent central bank will tighten monetary policy if they are
awarded excess wage increases. In this situation, an independent central bank does
not need to tighten monetary policy too aggressively, and this is regulated to the
degree necessary to control inflation as real wages are relatively low. Consequently,
this results in both low inflation and low unemployment.11)
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As previously stated, there has been no agreement on what type of wage-
bargaining system may lead to wage restraints. However, it has generally been
argued that both low inflation and low unemployment are achieved in countries that
have both an independent central bank that tries to stabilize prices and a wage-
bargaining system that leads to wage restraints.
3. The Bubble Economy in Japan in the late 1980s
This section explains why the stock-price bubble was inflated in the late 1980s
in Japan where both low inflation and low unemployment had been accomplished
from the late 1970s to the early 1980s within the framework of a comparative
political economy.
3.1. Overcoming Stagflation
From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, Japan overcame stagflation better and
earlier than other industrial countries. There are two main reasons for this. First,
wage increases had been restrained since 1975 because the export sector had taken
the initiative in the annual wage bargaining and its trade unions had cooperated
with employers by restraining wage increases, even though public-sector trade
unions had gained wage increases. Second, the BOJ had implemented monetary
policy and placed top priority on the stability of prices.12)
It is generally believed that the BOJ was not very independent of the
government before the Bank of Japan Act was revised in 1998. In fact, Prime
Minister Kakuei Tanaka compelled the BOJ to implement an excessively lax
monetary policy in 1972. This caused a vicious price spiral in 1973 with the first oil
crisis. However, learning from this failure, the BOJ has placed the utmost priority
on price stability since the late 1970s. It has tried to implement monetary policy to
control inflation, resisting pressure from politicians within the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) to ease monetary policy excessively.
The BOJ’s responses to the second oil crisis in 1979 conclusively improved the
BOJ’s reputation as “an inflation fighter.” From April 1979 to March 1980, the
BOJ continued to raise the official discount rate from 3.5% to 9.0%. In particular,
when the budget draft was deliberated at the Diet in February 1980, the BOJ raised
this despite strong opposition from the MOF and the LDP. These timely increases
in interest rates enabled the Japanese economy to overcome the second oil shock
because inflation was controlled. Through this experience of forestalling inflation,
the BOJ became highly credible from the viewpoint of private economic agents.13)
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3.2. Rises in Stock Prices
Next, I will explain the reasons stock prices soared to such extremes in the
1980s. As previously stated, it is generally believed that Japan’s economic bubble
emerged because monetary policy had been eased for a long time. It is certain that
the economic bubble was inflated because of the low interest-rate policy from 1986
to 1989. However, stock prices began rising in 1983.14) It should thus be interpreted
that the easing of monetary policy since 1986 did not cause stock prices to increase.
After other factors had already raised stock prices, monetary policy was eased and
this drove up stock prices tremendously. In addition, various factors other than
monetary relaxation contributed to driving up stock prices, which had already been
on the rise.
There were five main factors that raised stock prices other than loosening
monetary policy. First, investment in stocks increased. In December 1980, in order
to prompt companies and banks to purchase the government bonds that had been
issued on a massive scale, the MOF permitted them to adopt an accounting
procedure of dividing the book prices of securities that they already held and those
of securities that they had bought by using cash in trust (the so-called Boka-Bunri).
Since companies were able to save on their corporate income tax, most companies
adopted this accounting procedure and corporate investment funds (specified
money trusts, the so-called Tokkin) became a trend. This gave rise to the boom in
speculative investment on the stock exchange (the so-called Zai-Tech boom).15)
Moreover, the stocks of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT),
which had been privatized in 1985, were sold in 1987 and stock prices continued to
increase. This triggered a Zai-Tech boom among ordinary people who had not
invested in the stock market.
Second, the management of companies came to attach importance to the high
prices of their shares. When they increased capital, they had long-term shareholders
who kept cross-shareholding with them to purchase their shares in case their prices
dropped.16) In fact, the MOF permitted securities companies to control the stock
prices of their client companies for a given period before stocks were issued, if they
called the ministry for permission in advance.17)
Third, the government pursued a policy of fiscal austerity to improve the budget
balance in the 1980s. Because it limited the number of government bonds it issued,
government bonds themselves could not absorb all surplus funds in the market and
stocks were subsequently bought.18)
Fourth, the financial crisis in 1987 was quickly overcome. On October 19, 1987,
the New York Stock Exchange collapsed. Stock prices also dropped on the Tokyo
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Stock Exchange the following day. The executives of both the Securities Bureau of
the MOF and the four major securities companies held a regular meeting that day.
They decided by tacit agreement that fixed limits for proprietary trading would be
eased and securities companies would prop up share prices. Also, the securities
companies themselves arranged not to send selling orders to the stock market.19)
Moreover, the MOF pressed investment companies to purchase shares.20) By doing
so, the stock prices rallied.
However, at the end of December 1987, life insurance companies started to sell
stocks in bulk to cover the loss in dollar earnings and corporate investment funds.
In April 1987, the Banking Bureau of the MOF had already instructed firms to
change the accounting standard from cost-purchase accounting to lower cost
accounting in March 1988. The Securities Bureau of the MOF became concerned
about the sell-off of shares and asked the Banking Bureau to again change the
accounting standard. Thus, the Banking Bureau instructed firms to postpone the
introduction of lower cost accounting until April 1, 1988. Because of this,
companies did not need to write down the loss and life-insurance companies did not
have to sell stocks in mass quantities.21)
In this way, the MOF succeeded in preventing share prices from declining. After
that, stock prices surged remarkably. This was because these measures by the MOF
to contain the markets made investors believe that the ministry would never let
stock prices slump.
Fifth, an economic theory that justified high stock prices emerged. The Japan
Securities Research Institute released a report in October 1988. This report argued
that stock prices were not too high, taking into consideration the market value of
the companies’ assets. This was simply because the price of land that companies
owned was excessively high.22)
The myth of “permanent low-interest rates” also prevailed in the markets. This
was because the International Finance Bureau of the MOF supported the
international opinion that Japan should retain its low interest rates for as long as
possible in order to shore up the world economy.23)
3.3. Easing of Monetary Policy
I will now explain why the BOJ continued to loosen monetary policy in the late
1980s even though stock prices surged extraordinarily.
The yen rose steeply since the Plaza Accord in September 1985. The BOJ
lowered its official discount rate five times, i.e., in January 1986, March 1986,
April 1986, November 1986, and February 1987. During this period, it was certain
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that the U.S. and the MOF had requested the BOJ to cut interest rates. However, the
sharp appreciation of the yen against the dollar had forced the economy into
recession and raised unemployment until the beginning of 1987. In this situation, it
was not so unreasonable to ease monetary policy.24)
The problem was why the BOJ had not raised its official discount rate until May
1989 despite economic recovery, the rapid expansion of the economy, and asset-
price inflation. This can generally be explained by the behavior of the executive
officials of the MOF and the caucus of the LDP who forced the BOJ not to raise
interest rates. They remarked off-the-record that Vice-Governor Yasushi Mieno,
who had repeated statements that increased interest rates were needed to prevent
inflation, was ill-suited to be governor of the BOJ. As BOJ officials had supported
Mieno’s promotion to the governorship because he had built his career at the BOJ,
they refrained from raising interest rates.25)
However, I previously clarified that the executives of the BOJ did not reach
agreement on increasing its official discount rate and they could not make a
decision to increase it for three main reasons.
First, the BOJ was afraid that interest rate hikes in Japan might cause the dollar
to crash. Actually, in summer 1987, it considered increasing interest rates and
directed short-term interest rates to climb higher in the market from the end of
August. However, stock prices plunged on the New York Stock Exchange on
October 19 (Black Monday) and the dollar continued to depreciate after that. This
happened because the German Federal Bank (the central bank of the Federal
Republic of Germany) was thought to have been responsible for increasing the
short-term interest rates on the market. Therefore, it decided to stop directing short-
term interest rates to climb higher and gave up on raising its official discount rate.
Second, it could not perceive that the inflated asset prices were a bubble (i.e.,
they did not reflect real demand) on the grounds that asset prices had increased
before it had loosened monetary policy. Moreover, it did not perceive that asset-
price inflation would cause problems that would be too serious in the future. Thus,
it did not have a clear awareness of a need to burst the asset-price bubble through
imposing a credit squeeze.
Third, despite the inflation of asset prices, commodity prices were stable. The
inflation rate was about 0% from 1986 to 1988. It was common knowledge that
central banks should not use monetary policy to stabilize asset prices since these
were determined by various factors other than interest rates.
In fact in May 1989, when commodity prices rose slightly, the BOJ increased its
official discount rate even though this was not then regarded as sufficiently urgent
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to be necessary. This seemed to indicate that the BOJ was not as dependent on the
government as had generally been thought.26)
Of these three reasons, the most important is that commodity prices were stable
during this period.27) If commodity prices had risen as asset prices surged, the BOJ,
which placed top priority on the stability of prices, would have tightened monetary
policy and thereby the inflation in asset prices would have been curbed.
Consequently, stable prices for commodities were the main reason for excessively
elevating asset prices. Why were commodity prices stable during this period?
3.4. Stable Commodity Prices
The three main reasons for stable commodity prices despite inflation in asset
prices are discussed in what follows.
First, wages were held down relative to the buoyant economy. From 1984 to
1989, real wage increases averaged 1.9% per year, even though the average
productivity growth (in all sectors) was 6.3% per year.28) Since 1975, wage
increases had been restrained as the export sector had taken the initiative in the
annual wage bargaining. Despite the overheating economy during the bubble
period, wage increases were restrained in the same way.
Second, the inflation that was expected did not occur. This was because the BOJ
had gained a great deal of credibility with private economic agents in preventing
inflation.29) It had implemented monetary policy to control inflation and had
stabilized prices since the late 1970s. Hence, it had built up an excellent reputation
as a central bank that could stabilize prices. Due to this experience, the expected
inflation rate among private economic agents remained low and Japan achieved the
most stable prices of any other developed country through the 1980s.30)
Therefore, it seems that private economic agents regarded the easing of
monetary policy after the Plaza Accord as a response to emergency situations and
they thought that the BOJ would change this policy and avert inflation when prices
started to rise.31) This is why expectations of inflation did not occur and commodity
prices were stable despite the easing of monetary policy.
Third, the strong yen and declining oil prices brought prices down.32)
3.5. Concluding Remarks
Almost no one has argued that tight monetary policy should be implemented to
control inflated stock prices. This is both because asset prices had increased before
the BOJ loosened monetary policy and because commodity prices were stable.
Hence, monetary policy continued to be eased and the bubble in asset prices was
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inflated.
From the viewpoint of a comparative political economy, wage restraints and the
central bank’s outstanding credibility in avoiding inflation are very important.
These had contributed to low inflation and low unemployment from the late 1970s
to the early 1980s. However, because of these, commodity prices did not increase
even though asset prices surged in the late 1980s. As a result, monetary policy
continued to be eased and the bubble in asset prices was inflated even further.
4. The Bubble Economy in the U.S. in the late 1990s
The process and mechanism for the stock-price bubble in the U.S. in the late
1990s were very similar to those in Japan in the late 1980s. Like Japan, stock prices
in the U.S. surged for similar reasons and monetary policy was not tightened
because commodity prices were stable despite the bubble in stock prices.
4.1. Revival of U.S. Economy
In the early 1990s, the U.S. economy slipped into a serious recession. However,
thanks to adequate monetary policies, wage restraints, and efforts toward fiscal
reconstruction, it recovered.
To begin with, I will explain what these adequate monetary policies were. In
July 1992, the Federal Reserve lowered the target rate for federal funds to 3%. At
that time, the inflation rate was about 3%. The Federal Reserve maintained this real
zero-interest-rate policy until February 1994, stimulating the economy.33)
In February 1994, the Federal Reserve increased the rate of federal funds. This
decision surprised the markets because the inflation rate had not increased very
much and the unemployment rate still remained high, although the economy had
started to recover and the unemployment rate was about to decrease. The Federal
Reserve continued to increase interest rates until February 1995.34) During this
period, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan did not aim to cool
the economy down to below the level of full employment to reduce the inflation
rate, but to achieve a so-called soft landing at about the level of full employment
without overheating the economy. He succeeded in fine-tuning the economy and
established a reputation as “the macroeconomic magician.”35)
Next, I will discuss wage restraints.  The bargaining power of trade unions was
markedly reduced in the 1980s. There were two main reasons for this. First, the rate
of unionization declined substantially as employment in manufacturing decreased
and that in services increased. Second, the Reagan administration took tough action
against strikes.36) In addition, many workers were retrenched in manufacturing and
29OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 57 (February 2010)
the financial industry at the beginning of the 1990s. This forced workers to
acknowledge their jobs were insecure and this restrained their wage demands.37)
Finally, I will point out efforts that were made toward fiscal reconstruction. The
Clinton administration gave maximum priority to reducing budget deficits and
decided to cut fiscal expenditures and increase taxes beyond the expectations of
markets. Consequently, market players expected reduced fiscal deficits and long-
term interest rates fell rapidly. This strongly stimulated the economy and created a
boom in business investments.38)
4.2. Rise in Stock Prices
Next, I will explain five of the main reasons stock prices soared in the 1990s. As
in Japan, the easing of monetary policy did not seem to cause stock prices to rise in
the U.S. After other factors had already raised stock prices, monetary policy was
eased and this greatly drove up stock prices.
First, investment in stocks increased. In the 1990s, the number of companies
that offered 401(k) plans, or defined contribution pension plans, to their employees
increased. This provided opportunities for ordinary people who had previously not
invested in the stock market to learn about investments and become familiar with it.
They became more willing to invest in stocks.39)
Second, the management of companies came to attach great importance to the
high prices of their shares. Most companies since the 1980s had adopted
“maximizing shareholder value” as their management principle. This tendency was
strengthened in the 1990s as the stock-option system was introduced to provide
rewards to executives. Then, numerous companies purchased their own stocks and
liquidated them. By decreasing the number of outstanding shares, they expected
their share price would rise and their return on equity (ROE), which was seen as a
critical indicator of stock investment, would also rise.40)
As a result, many companies committed accounting fraud to drive up the prices
of their shares. These were successively revealed after the stock-price bubble
collapsed.41)
Third, the government pursued a policy of fiscal austerity to balance the budget
in the 1990s. Because this limited the number of government bonds issued,
government bonds themselves could not absorb all surplus funds on the market.
Then, funds flowed onto the stock market and stock prices were driven up.
Fourth, the financial crisis in 1998 was promptly overcome. On August 17,
1998, the Russian government devalued the ruble and declared a 90-day
moratorium on its repayments of foreign debts. This dramatically devalued most
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foreign and corporate bond portfolios and Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM), a hedge fund specializing in large-scale speculation, suffered massive
losses. If LTCM were allowed to fail and defaulted on its debts, a serious crisis in
the financial system could have occurred. Then, at the instigation of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, the 16 banks and securities and investment-banking
firms that had money in LTCM rescued it by contributing $3.6 billion.42) Moreover,
the Federal Reserve reduced interest rates three times from September to
November, trying to stabilize the international financial market.43)
These responses to the financial crisis prevented it from becoming global and
U.S. financial authorities became appreciated to a greater extent. However, as
investors placed too much confidence in their ability to control the financial crisis,
they estimated their investment risks to be much lower than they really were.
Consequently, they became addicted to higher risk investments and the bubble
expanded.
Fifth, an economic theory that justified high stock prices emerged. It was the
theory of the New Economy that argued that there was a permanent structural
change in the U.S. economy. New Economy theorists insisted that the utilization of
IT had permanently improved the productivity of labor and that this had eliminated
limits to potential economic growth and thus business cycles. They argued that
rapidly increasing stock prices were reasonable, which simply reflected
improvements in the real economy.44)
4.3. Easing Monetary Policy
I will now explain why monetary policy was not tightened even though stock
prices surged astonishingly in the late 1990s.
Most economists in the mid-1990s thought that the potential growth rate in the
U.S. was around 2.5% and the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU) was around 6.0%. They believed that inflation would occur if economic
growth above 2.5% continued and unemployment dipped below the NAIRU.
However, the inflation rate did not rise in the late of 1990s, even though the
economic growth rate was above 2.5% and the unemployment rate was below
6.0%. At the time, Greenspan determined that this was because productivity had
grown and the unit labor cost had fallen. He persuaded the Federal Open Market
Committee not to attack inflation preemptively but rather to wait until they could
see clear evidence that inflation was rising. The Federal Reserve did not raise
interest rates in the face of this extraordinarily low unemployment.45)
If the inflation rate had risen during this period with the expanding economy as
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was expected by most economists, Greenspan should have tightened monetary
policy to curb inflation. Then, the economy would have been prevented from
overheating and inflated stock prices would also have been curbed. Commodity
prices in the U.S., as in Japan, were stable even though the economy expanded and
stock prices surged sharply. Therefore, monetary policy continued to be eased and
the bubble in asset prices was inflated.
Moreover, just as the BOJ had faced Black Monday in 1987, the Federal
Reserve faced the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian default in 1998 and
it missed opportunities of raising interest rates.46) This is one reason that the policy
of low interest rates was extended.
4.4. Stable Commodity Prices
There were three main reasons for the stability in commodity prices despite the
inflation of asset prices.
First, wages were held down relatively despite the buoyant economy. From 1995
to 2000, real wage increases averaged 1.3% per year, even though the growth in
average productivity (in nonagricultural sectors) was 2.5% per year.47)
One of the reasons for this is the “traumatized worker hypothesis,” which argues
that workers who feel their jobs are insecure in changing economies will accept
smaller wage increases. After having been menaced by corporate restructuring,
experienced suffering due to the recession, and then struggling through the
“jobless” recovery in 1990–1991, American workers became more concerned with
job security than with real wage increases. Moreover, American labor was thought
to have suffered not just temporary trauma, but to actually have seen its bargaining
position eroded on a permanent (or at least long-lasting) basis.48)
There are two reasons the bargaining power of labor was reduced. The first is
that the rate of unionization declined substantially as employment in manufacturing
decreased and that in services increased. Due to this, the position and influence of
trade unions slipped. This changed labor-management relations from hostile to
cooperative.49)  The second reason is that the number of irregular employees
increased. Corporations in the 1990s increased the number of irregular employees
to spare them the cost of having to provide employee benefits (e.g., medical- and
retirement-benefit plans).50) An increasing number of irregular employees ceased
union membership and this made regular employees feel added job insecurity.
Management had strong bargaining power against irregular employees since they
had no security of employment. Therefore, an increasing number of irregular
employees led to wage restraints, compelling workers to place the highest priority
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on job security and restrain their wage demands. This was the very situation that
dualism theory had predicted.
Second, Greenspan established the credibility of his anti-inflationary policies. In
February 1994, the Federal Reserve raised the rate for federal funds, which
surprised the market, as the inflation rate had not yet risen. This continued
preemptive rate hikes until February 1995.51) Greenspan’s contributions in
preventing inflation were greatly appreciated.
Through this experience, private economic agents expected that he would be
able to curb inflation in the future. As a result, inflationary expectations remained
very low through the late 1990s, even though the economy was overheating.
Third, Robert Rubin, who took office as Treasury Secretary in 1995,
aggressively supported a strong dollar.52) The appreciation of the dollar lowered
import prices and oil prices. Hence, the inflation rate fell.53)
4.5. Concluding Remarks
As had not been done in Japan, monetary policy was not tightened to control
rising stock prices. This was both because asset prices had increased before the Fed
loosened monetary policy and because commodity prices were stable.
From the viewpoint of a comparative political economy, wage restraints and the
high credibility of a central bank in controlling inflation are very important. These
contributed to low inflation and low unemployment in the U.S. However, because
of these, commodity prices did not increase even though asset prices surged. As a
result, monetary policy continued to be eased and the bubble of asset prices was
inflated further.
5. Conclusion
I have examined the stock-price bubbles in Japan and the U.S. in this article. As
the theory of comparative political economy has argued, the combination of anti-
inflationary monetary policy and wage restraints has certainly led to low inflation
and low unemployment. However, this combination has brought about a situation
where commodity prices do not increase despite the inflation of asset prices. It may
thus cause a massive bubble once inflation in asset prices emerges.
Undeniably, there were some factors that drove up stock prices in both countries
beyond those supported by the fundamentals. The inflation in stock prices was
attributed to these. Then, because of both independent central banks that curbed
inflation and wage-bargaining systems that led to wage restraints, inflation was
overcome. Thus, commodity prices kept stable despite the sharp rises in stock
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prices. As a result, tight monetary policies were not eased and massive bubbles in
stock prices were inflated.
Moreover, such situations are increasingly likely to occur in the future. There
are three reasons for this. First, with the progress of globalization, international
capital flows are increasing. Consequently, huge amounts of money are flowing
into financial markets and stock-price bubbles are more likely to happen. Second,
because globalization also intensifies international competition between enterprises,
wage increases may be restrained. Third, due to the liberalization of capital
movement, countries have to control inflation more stringently. If inflation
emerges, capital rapidly flows abroad. For this reason, the governments have to
make central banks independent of them.
To summarize, the progress in globalization has enhanced the possibility of
stock-price bubbles emerging and has forced countries to implement monetary
policies to rigorously curb inflation and impose rigid wage restraints.
Unemployment used to decrease and wages used to increase in industrial
countries with improvements in the economy. This raised prices. The central bank
then used to tighten monetary policy and cool the economy down. As a result,
unemployment increased and this reduced wage pressure and inflation. In short,
price rises through wage increases used to signal central banks that the economy
was overheating.
However, with the growth in globalization, this mechanism has failed. Although
the economy is overheating, wages and prices do not increase and inflationary
expectations remain low in more countries. Because prices remain stable in this
situation, it is difficult for the central bank to tighten monetary policies even if
inflation in asset prices emerges. For that reason, once asset-price inflation has
emerged, the possibility for it to become a massive bubble increases remarkably.
It has been argued in comparative political economy what kinds of political
factors are required to overcome stagflation. The answer is a combination of
monetary policy to curb inflation and a wage-bargaining system that leads to wage
restraints. This is now an effective measure that results in low inflation and low
unemployment. While unemployment is admittedly still a serious problem, as
globalization continues to progress, the asset-price bubbles and deflation that may
follow its collapse become more serious threats than inflation. As I clarified earlier
in this article, the combination of monetary policy to curb inflation and a wage-
bargaining system leading to wage restraints can cause a massive bubble once
asset-price inflation emerges. Then, the bursting of the economic bubble places
deflationary pressure on the economy. That is, at present, the combination of anti-
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inflationary monetary policies and wage restraints do not necessarily ensure sound
economic performance for the long term. Therefore, comparative political economy
will have to develop new analytical frameworks that can deal with not only
inflation and unemployment but also bubbles and deflation.
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